Mary Gordon's short story, Mrs. Cassidy's Last Year, is about a family trying to cope, not only with Mrs. Cassidy, who has dementia and is physically and verbally abusive, but also with her elderly husband's difficulties caring for her at home. Mr. Cassidy's dilemma, expressed through the dissonance between his private "inner talk" of emotions and desires that he feels are forbidden and shameful, and his insistence to his son and daughter-in-law that his wife is still the woman he married and her care is not too much for him. This article attempts to open up conceptual space on such questions of caregiver perceptions of the personhood (who they are now), and "personness"-the motivations and intentions-of the person with dementia; caregiver and family motivations and feeling states; and the ways that cultural narratives of obligation in family caregiving affect a caregiver's sense of self and moral certitude. In addition, the story helps us to consider the implications of a bifurcation between a caregiver's inner feelings, and what he or she understands to be the way he or she should feel and act publically. The article attempts to illustrate the interplay and tensions between narratives-master narratives from the culture, those from more immediate ideological environments, auto-and biographical stories, memories, and the stories we tell ourselves about who we are-and how these come into stark relief in the context of a radically altered intimate relationship.
Mary Gordon's short story, Mrs. Cassidy 's Last Year (1987 , 2013 , is about a family trying to cope, not only with Mrs. Cassidy, who has dementia, but also with her elderly husband's difficulties in caring for her at home. It is a spare story-the only other characters are Tom, the Cassidy's son, and his wife Toni. As the story opens, Mr. Cassidy is at home alone with his elderly wife who is given to violent and abusive outbursts. His self-narrative begins as follows:
...he couldn't go to Communion. He had sinned against charity. He had wanted his wife dead. The intention had been his and the desire. (p. 96) Mr. Cassidy, who had long ago promised his wife that he would allow her to die in her own bed, struggles with the immediate physical and emotional demands of caring for his wife, yet insists to his son and daughter-in-law that it is not too much for him, "She's my wife" he says when they find him on his knees trying to clean up the eggs and juice that his wife-laughing and cursing at him-has thrown on the floor. "Shitscraper," she laughs.
Gordon's story allows us to consider an aspect of dementia care in a close relationship that may not be readily accessed by formal studies that focus on caregiver and care receiver traits and behaviors and/or the objective conditions of the care relationship. Mr. Cassidy's dilemma is expressed through the dissonance between his personal narrative-the story he "tells himself and others about who he is and how he fits in the world" (Palmer, 2016) -and his private "inner talk" of emotions and desires that he feels are forbidden and shameful. He aspires to be the kind of person who keeps his promises yet feels helpless in caring for his wife. His insistence to his son and daughter-in-law that his wife is still the woman he married and her care is not too much for him is in service of his aspirational self but is viewed by them as delusional and unfair to them.
The story, when read alongside selected quotes and themes from studies of caregiver narratives (Gubrium, 1988 (Gubrium, , 2000 Rubinstein, 1989) , provides an opportunity to consider the interrelatedness of self-narrative, self-other relational dynamics, and moral reasoning in the context of a master narrative that values family over formal care. For my analysis, I propose a heuristic-a speculative formulation-conceptualizing "personhood" as focused on the person with dementia as "object," and "personness" as focused on the relationship (intersubjectivity) between the caregiver and receiver. I am not proposing a dichotomous conceptualization but two mutually reinforcing aspects of moral reasoning about caregiving, both of which come into play as the caregiver attempts to reconcile his inner emotional experience with the cultural and social constraints of his situation. If the caregiver views the person as "still there" (personhood) that necessarily includes his sense that the person is expressing feelings about their relationship (personness). The central dilemma I explore is the crux of the story-Mr. Cassidy's insistence that his wife is still his wife accompanied by the guilt and shame he feels about her actions toward him. To give her care over to others is irreconcilable with the aspirations of his personal narrativethe good person he wishes to be. To uphold his personal narrative, he must take a stance on the existential question of personhood (Who is Rose now? Is she still the woman I married?). For his family, viewing Rose as not the same person (not a "self") is a socially acceptable excuse for Mr. Cassidy to relinquish care, but for him it violates his sense of a moral self. He is not convinced that Rose is no longer Rose. For him, she has personness-memories, motivations, emotions, and intentions not too different from those qualities she had before dementia.
Mr. Cassidy attempts to scaffold the narrative of his preferred self-identity by insisting that Rose is still Rose-the woman he married. In this way, he can believe himself to be a person who keeps his promises and he can believe he is still the same man who married Rose. Even his projections and interpretations of her intentions serve to maintain his belief that he is still in a relationship with Rose-not someone he does not recognize. Yet he wants her dead-the only way he sees that he can escape his dilemma. Something critical is at stake for Mr. Cassidy that he so desperately clings to the narrative that the person he's caring for is still his wife-radically altered but his wife still. That narrative serves to prevent him from acting on his anger, but he cannot escape his consciousness of wishing her dead. As long as Rose is the woman he married and to whom he made that promise, then in that relationship with her he is the moral being he sees himself to be. Otherwise, who is he? In this article, I first review the background of this present study, then, drawing on selected caregiver studies, propose a narrative perspective on the dementia care experience.
Background
In the tradition of literary gerontology, and inspired by the work of Woodward (1991) , Wyatt-Brown and Rossen (1993) , Gullette (2008) , Wallace (2015) , Swinnen and Port (2012) and others, I seek the conceptual insights that can be drawn from literature, drama, and autobiographical accounts. My initial interest in this and similar stories about dementia caregiving related to the puzzling question of why family caregivers, even those who are under great stress, so often resist using formal care. Our earlier work with this question (England and Ganzer, 1992, Ganzer and England, 1994) suggested that moral reasoning was a promising avenue for expanding upon (or challenging) the conceptualizations of caregiver burden focusing on individual traits of the caregiver and behaviors of the care receiver.
In earlier studies, my colleagues and I used narrative approaches to study literature, memoir, and autobiographies to illuminate such aspects of care and dependency as reciprocity, self-agency, selfhood, the meaning and negotiation of domestic space, and the social exploitation of empathy and familial obligation. Upon re-reading some of the literature from these studies, as well as Gubrium's accounts of his studies of caregiver support groups (1988) and Rubinstein's in-depth interviews of caregivers (1989), I decided this time to focus on how a family caregiver of someone with Alzheimer's or a similar dementia might think, feel, and reason about the person he's caring for and about himself in the face of the radically altered relationship with the dementia sufferer. I once again chose the story partly because it aligned with the interests of our earlier studies. On one level it is "about" resistance to using formal services and illustrates the way that moral reasoning may be a more powerful influence on decision making than calculations of the emotional and other costs of continuing to provide care. I chose it as well because it is not about the cliché of caring for a "loved one", and it illustrates the tension between the socially constructed public meanings of the experience (Gubrium, 2000) 
Mrs. Cassidy's Last Year
Mary Gordon's short story depicts the not uncommon scenario of an elderly spouse caring for a partner in the stage of dementia where the care receiver may be suspicious and show anger and hostility to the caregiver. Mrs. Cassidy verbally abuses her husband, tosses her breakfast tray on the floor, and refuses to swallow her pills, holding them in her cheek and spitting them out when he is not looking. Viewing her behavior as intentional, Mr. Cassidy feels his anger rising and fears he may hurt her. He tries to keep his anger in check by reminding himself that she is his wifethe person he married long ago. Mr. Cassidy had reason to view his wife's actions as intentional-she had long been cold toward him. She blamed him when their favorite older son died in the war and "…had never forgiven him. For what he did not know .. [s] he turned from him then, letting some shelf drop, like a merchant at the hour of closing" (p. 98).
Mr. Cassidy saw they were all so unhappy, hated each other so because they thought things could be different. As he thought of his wife. He imagined she could be different if she wanted to. Which angered him.
Mr. Cassidy's dilemma-the way he constructs himself in his narrative-is centered around the promise he made to his wife Rose 50 years ago; that she would die in her own bed. He remembers the promise vividly.
"Swear," she said, lying next to him in bed when they were each no more than thirty. Her eyes were wild then…. Swear you will let me die in my own bed. Swear you won't let them take me away. He swore, her nails making dents in his palms, a dull shallow pain... He had sworn. (p. 97) Throughout the story, Mr. Cassidy views his current situation in the light of that promise-he is a man who keeps his promises and at the same time "He wished in his heart most purely for the woman to be dead." Mr. Cassidy constructs his narrative identity as a person who keeps his promises, yet the narrative is one of an intolerable dissonance between what he demands of himself as a moral being and the deep shame and helplessness he feels as the object of his wife's fury. He cannot reconcile these conflicting versions of himself. In voicing the acceptable language of keeping promises and honoring his marriage vows he performs the social role of faithful spouse. "She's my wife" and all that expression entails, sums up his anguish and the impossible dilemma he finds himself in, and there is no one-not even his priest or his God-to whom he can admit the unspeakable truth that he wants his wife dead.
At the end of the story, Mr. Cassidy tries to retrieve the pills that have landed in Rose's lap. Suddenly she screams at him and stands up.
He was astonished at her power. She had not stood by herself for seven months. She put one arm in front of her breast and raised the other to the floor, knocking him heavily to the floor. (p. 102) Rose walks out into the night leaving him lying there, his leg broken. Not able to move and no one to hear him as he calls for help; he thinks only of Rose and his promiseknowing it will be broken now. Finally, helpless, he begins to throw figurines at the windows.
He went on until he had broken six windows. He went on until he had broken every window in the front of the house. He had ruined his house. The one surprising thing of his long lifetime. The broken glass winked like green jewels, hard sea creatures on the green carpet. He looked at what he had destroyed. He never would have done it; it was something he would never have done. But he would not have believed he was a man who could not keep his promise. (p. 104)
Personhood
Mr. Cassidy insists that his wife is "still there"-the woman he married. Constructionist concepts about the self, identity and Alzheimer's disease (Bellenger, 2006; Cadell & Clare, 2010; Davis, 2004; Randall, 2009; Sabat & Harré, 1992) have focused on what constitutes the presence of a "self," but the research has not focused on what this question of self or presence might mean for a caregiver in an intimate situation. If we are indeed what Gergen (1991) and other postmodernists posit-multiple selves constructed in relationship to others-what then does this mean for the authoring of the self when an intimate and long-time relationship to another is no longer sustainable in its old form? If the person with dementia is not his "old self" and there is no hope that old self will be restored, does it not follow that the intimate who is now caregiver cannot be his or her old self?
In Gordon's short story, the questions of selfhood and presence are expressed in the conflicting narratives of Mr. Cassidy and his son Tom and his wife Toni. Toni says, "But look Pa, you've been a saint to her. But she's not the woman she was. Not the woman we knew." To which Mr. Cassidy replies, "She's the woman I married." "Not any more", says Toni. And Mr. Cassidy thinks, "If not, then who? People are the same. They kept their bodies. They did not become someone else. Rose was the woman he had married. … They were not different people now" (p. 99). For Mr. Cassidy, this rationalizes his resolve to continue to care for Rose, and in the context of his Catholicism his position makes moral sense. By preserving her personhood and with it, their marriage, he preserves his own sense of self. In social constructivist terms, his insistence on Rose's personhood is his way of managing social expectations and allows for the performative aspects of his commitment.
The narratives of family caregivers of dementia sufferers are replete with metaphoric and figurative language that attempts to describe what Gubrium (1988) terms the incommunicable experience of watching a loved one, in effect, disappear. In her story, Gordon uses the image of blankness-the opaqueness and lack of light in Mrs. Cassidy's eyes that so troubles Mr. Cassidy as he tries to find meaning in his wife's gaze.
She sat chewing, looking at the television. What was that look in her eyes now? Why did he want to call it wickedness? Because it was blank and hateful. Because there was no light. Eyes should have light. (p. 202) This imagery of darkness and blankness is common to many of these narratives, as is the focus on the eyes. As I think about the endurance of the ancient proverb, "The eyes are the windows to the soul" I am struck by its implications for a relational view of these narratives. When someone experiences the blank look in an intimate's eyes, it can be deeply unsettling-casting doubt in our minds about the nature of our own selfhood. And when an intimate refuses to look at or recognize a spouse or child, it may be interpreted as hostility. In these dementia narratives, eyes are often described as dim and inscrutable. Nothing is "behind" them or reflected back to the observer-the windows are shutor perhaps the soul is gone-the body an empty shell. As Gubrium observed in his study of Alzheimer caregiver support groups, some caregivers spoke of the demented spouse as a "shell of the former self" (2000, p. 185). Listening to such expressions as "mind's just gone drifting away," "not the lady I used to know," and "to me he's just gone, or getting there fast." Gubrium observes
The inner world of the dementia sufferer was a matter of continuing concern in the support groups as participants told stories about the mind or mental status of a cognitively impaired family member or loved one. Familiar slogans drawn from the public culture of the AD movement regularly signaled the urgency of coming to terms with "what's going on in that head of his?" Slogans such as "AD dims bright minds," "brain failure," and "the shell of the former self" conveyed the seemingly evident fact that an afflicted husband, wife or parent just wasn't the same any more--that something "in the head" had gone seriously wrong. What does it mean to lose a mind? (2000, p. 185) Seeing a deeply familiar body vacant of the person one has known, some of the spouses used these "culturally recognizable codes [in order] to communicate what it's like to witness the mental demise of a loved one" (Gubrium, p. 185) . If the moral of these kinds of stories is, "when the mind goes so does the person" (p. 193), the question of authoring/re-authoring the self when one's deepest sense of moral identity is severely challenged may imply that the relationship, with its imbedded patterns of loyalty and obligation, may be strained, if not stretched beyond the breaking point.
Personness
As long as Mr. Cassidy believes that Rose is still Rose, the question of personness persists, despite the pains-both psychic and physical-that her behaviors cause him. My conceptualization of personness (defined in Wiktionary as " [t] he state, quality, or condition of a person" (2015, n. p.)) is intertwined with personhood but adds intersubjectivity-the orientation of self to the orientation of the other (Gillespie & Cornish, 2009) . Additionally, the Cassidy marriage itself, though troubled, may be thought of as a "third"-a psychic entity or space in which the spouses negotiate memories, selves, agency, interpretations of each other's motives and emotions, and meanings of the relationship. (Here I am adapting Benjamin's (2004) psychoanalytic concept of "thirdness" to suggest that in Mr. Cassidy's mind at least there is still a "oneness" in the Cassidy's marriage.)
My reading of Gubrium's (1986) research with Alzheimer's disease (AD) spouse caregivers, and autobiographical and fictional accounts such as Mary Gordon's story, suggests that concerns expressed by caregiving spouses might be less about whether the person with AD is still there, that is, possessing a "self," and more about concerns about the care receiver's personness, and what those perceived attributes might mean to a caregiver. In psychology, the concept of theory of mind refers to one person's attribution to another mental states, desires, and intentions separate and different from one's own. Again as a heuristic, I propose that this attribution is a necessary component of intersubjectivity-the shared meanings and subjective states in a relationship between persons (Gillespie & Cornish, 2009; Scheff, 2006) . My interest here is the attribution of intention-a theme in many AD caregivers accounts. Several of Gubrium's caregivers talked of the AD sufferer "pulling stunts" that the caregivers found embarrassing. In Mrs. Cassidy's Last Year as Mr. Cassidy is on his knees trying to clean up the spilt breakfast, he thinks that his wife would know how to get the cranberry juice stain out of the carpet.
That was the sort of thing she knew but would not tell him now. She would laugh, wicked and bland-faced as an egg, when he did the wrong thing. But never say what was right, although she knew it, and her tongue was not dead for curses, for reports of crimes. (p. 96) Is Mrs. Cassidy deliberately and maliciously mocking him or is something else going on? That question of intentions; "What did he mean by that?" "Why is she sulking?" is so common a theme in these narratives causes me to wonder if it may not be an effort to create a narrative in which the caregiver and dementia sufferer are still in a relationshipone with a history, memory, and emotions. Without these, the caregiver may guess at the meaning of actions or project his own feelings on the situation in order to cope with an experience so utterly dissonant that is beyond the reach of language and understanding.
When the deeply forgetful person with dementia no longer knows who she is or who the caregiver is, telling the story of the relationship is what Gubrium calls "a narrative watershed" that puts into question "the moral underpinning of the relationship" (p. 194). In the case of Mr. Cassidy, his need to keep intact his core self-identity and life narrative as someone who keeps his promises is why he sees his Rose, in spite of her curses ("Never spoken by her before"), as the same person she has always been. If she is no longer who she was, then their relationship, their home, their memories, his promise, and his sense of self-worth are all broken. This profound brokenness fully presents itself in the final scene of the story when Mr. Cassidy breaks all of the windows in the front of his house, "The one surprising thing of his long lifetime" (p. 104).
Implications for Practice and Future Inquiry
In that it is based on a fictional account, it is reasonable to question how applicable my analysis is to practice situations. I am not arguing here for the story as a proxy for a possible real-life experience but have attempted to use Mr. Cassidy's internal turmoil to draw attention to the social construction and relational dynamics of his dilemma. With these conceptualizations in mind, there is some evidence that narrative practices that provide an opportunity for caregivers to speak at length and tell the story of their experience may allow them to express some of the same ambivalence and dilemmas as those of Mr. Cassidy. Rubinstein's (1989) in-depth interviews elicited accounts of adult children caring for a parent, some of whom were at least as difficult as Mrs. Cassidy. Their stories revealed themes similar to those in the Gordon story. Rubinstein identified four commonalities or analytic themes in these stories. One theme was the presence of a third person "psychologically implicated in the caregiving account" (p. 135). That person would be Mr. Cassidy's son Tom in the Gordon story. A second theme was that the caregiver's story "… referred in detailed ways to previous events that were integral to the present-day events" (p. 136). Mr. Cassidy's promise is but one instance of that theme. Another is his interpretation of Rose's hostility as an expression of her years of coldness toward him. Another theme in Rubinstein's stories was that the caregivers "face their challenge, conceptualize it or communicate it" (p. 136) in terms of their personal theories of religion. Mr. Cassidy's personal ideas about his Catholicism and his sense that he had sinned against God for wishing his wife dead illustrate this theme. And in the closest parallel to my analysis of Gordon' What I have attempted to do in this article is to explore the interrelationships of these dilemmas with particular attention to the caregiver's attempts to reconcile his selfnarrative with his aspirational story about who he is in the world, and in his relationships with others. My analysis argues for a geriatric practice that is sensitive to narrativethe continuous self-authoring, co-authoring, and co-readings (Randall, 2009 ) that compose the shared and changing lives of those with dementia and their caregivers. The correlates between Gubrium's and Rubinstein's research and the themes in Mr. Cassidy's Last Year suggest that practitioners and researchers may expand their conceptual perspectives by foregrounding the dilemmas of personhood, personness, moral reasoning, social expectations, and the ways they challenge a caregiver's sense of a coherent and acceptable self-narrative.
Conclusion
There are as many meanings to be found in Mary Gordon's story, as there are readers. Some may resonate with the victimhood of Mr. Cassidy. Others may ponder how rare it is to hear stories about how caregivers cope-or not-with violence and abuse. Others will reflect on the limits of obligation and love, whereas others may marvel at Mr. Cassidy's devotion and refusal to deny his wife's selfhood. All of these are worthy subjects for further inquiry. What I have attempted to do here is to illustrate the interplay and tensions between narratives-master narratives from the culture, those from more immediate ideological environments, auto-and biographical stories, memories, and the stories we tell ourselves about who we are-and how these come into stark relief in the context of a radically altered intimate relationship. Mr. Cassidy bases his steadfast commitment to keeping his wife at home on the manly code of honor that men keep their promises. His Catholic faith would be the basis for his insistence in keeping his marital vows but also the source of his feelings of guilt over wanting his wife dead. His moral world view is in synch with and constructed by the master narrative ideologies of austerity and family self-sufficiency that view turning care over to others as a moral failure.
In the worlds of meaning of dementia care, the accepted public meanings assume the altruism of caregivers, thus subjugating and hiding suffering and existential conflicts so effectively that many aspects of the care experience become unspeakable-forbidden. As with the Cassidys, the micropolitics within families reproduce political-economic master narratives and shape the opportunity structure and moral reasoning of dependency and caregiving. The story questions the limits of spousal commitment and the conflicting interests of family members; for example, the conflict between Mr. Cassidy and his son revolves around the son's anger about the burdens that have fallen to him and his wife as a result of his father's refusal to admit that he is not up to taking care of his wife. For many families, the choices are stark, unpaid family care is expected, and acceptable alternatives are few or non-existent. This becomes particularly acute when the person with dementia is highly agitated, abusive, and violent, further limiting options for out-of-home community-based care.
